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Abstract 
Contemporary approaches to decision making describe a decision problem by sets of states 
and outcomes, and a rich set of acts: functions from states to outcomes over which the 
decision maker (DM) has preferences. Real problems do not come so equipped. It is often 
unclear what the state and outcome spaces would be. We present an alternative foundation 
for decision making, in which the primitive objects of choice are syntactic programs. We 
show that if the DM's preference relation on objects of choice satisfies appropriate axioms, 
then we can find states, outcomes, and an embedding of the programs into Savage acts 
such that preferences can be represented by EU in the Savage framework. A modeler can 
test for SEU behavior without having access to the subjective states and outcomes. We 
illustrate the power of our approach by showing that it can represent DMs who are subject to 
framing effects. 
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1In memoriam Karl Vind.
1 Introduction
Most models of decisionmaking under uncertainty describe a decision environment
with a set of states and a set of outcomes. Objects of choice are acts, functions
from states to outcomes. The decision maker (DM) holds a preference relation on
the set of all such functions. Representation theorems characterize those prefer-
ence relations with utility functions on acts that separate (more or less) tastes on
outcomes from beliefs on states. The canonical example is Savage’s (1954) charac-
terization of those preference relations that have a subjective expected utility (SEU)
representation: Acts are ranked by the expectation of a utility payoff on their out-
comes with respect to a probability distribution on states. Choquet expected utility
(Schmeidler 1989) maintains the separation between tastes and beliefs, but does not
require that beliefs be represented by an additive measure. Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1992) cumulative prospect theory relaxes the taste-belief separation by assessing
gains and losses with different belief measures; Wakker and Tversky (1993) discuss
generalizations of SEU from this point of view. Modern attempts to represent am-
biguity in choice theory relax both the meaning of likelihood and the separation of
tastes and beliefs that characterize SEU. All of these generalizations of SEU, how-
ever, maintain the state-outcome-act description of objects of choice and, moreover,
take this description of choice problems as being given prior to the consideration of
any preference notion.
We, on the other hand, follow Ellsberg (2001) in locating the source of am-
biguity in the description of the problem. For Savage (1954, p. 9), the world is ‘the
object about which the person is concerned’ and a state of the world is ‘a description
of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed.’ But what are the ‘relevant’ de-
scriptors of the world? Choices do not come equipped with states. Instead they are
typically objects described by their manner of realization, such as ‘buy 100 shares of
IBM’ or ‘leave the money in the bank,’ ‘attack Iraq,’ or ‘continue to negotiate.’ In Sav-
age’s account (1954, sec. 2.3) it is clear that the DM ‘constructs the states’ in contem-
plating the decision problem. In fact, his discussion of the rotten egg foreshadows this
process. Subsequently, traditional decision theory has come to assume that states
are given as part of the description of the decision problem. We suppose instead that
states are constructed by the DM in the course of deliberating about questions such
2as ‘How is choice A different from choice B?’ and ‘In what circumstances will choice
A turn out better than choice B?’. These same considerations apply (although here
Savage may disagree) to outcomes. This point has been forcefully made by Weibull
(2004).
There are numerous papers in the literature that raise issues with the state-
space approach of Savage or that derive a subjective state space. Machina (2006)
surveys the standard approach and illustrates many difficulties with the theory and
with its uses. These difficulties include the ubiquitous ambiguity over whether the
theory is meant to be descriptive or normative, whether states are exogenous or con-
structed by the DM, whether states are external to the DM, and whether they are
measurable or not. Kreps (1992) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) use a
menu choice model to deal with unforeseen contingencies—an inability of the DM to
list all possible states of the world. They derive a subjective state space that repre-
sents possible preference orders over elements of the menu chosen by the DM. Ghi-
rardato (2001) takes an alternative approach to unforeseen contingencies and mod-
els acts as correspondences from a state space to outcomes. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2004) and Karni (2006) raise objections to the state space that are similar to ours
and develop decision theories without a state space. Both papers derive subjective
probabilities directly on outcomes. Ahn (2008) also develops a theory without a state
space; in his theory, the DM chooses over sets of lotteries over consequences. Ahn
and Ergin (2007) allow for the possibility that there may be different descriptions of a
particular event, and use this possibility to capture framing. For them, a ‘description’
is a partition of the state space. They provide an axiomatic foundation for decision
making in this framework, built on Tversky and Koehler’s (1994) notion of support
theory.
Our approach differs significantly from these mentioned above. The inspira-
tion for our approach is the observation that objects of choice in an uncertain world
have some structure to them. Individuals choose among some simple actions: ‘buy
100 shares of IBM’ or ‘attack Iraq’. But they also perform various tests on the world
and make choices contingent upon the outcome of these tests: ‘If the stock broker
recommends buying IBM, then buy 100 shares of IBM; otherwise buy 100 shares of
Google.’ These tests are written in a fixed language (which we assume is part of the
description of the decision problem, just as Savage assumed that states were part of
the description of the decision problem). The language is how the DM describes the
world. We formalize this viewpoint by taking the objects of choice to be (syntactic)
programs in a programming language.
3The programming language is very simple—we use it just to illustrate our
ideas. Critically, it includes tests (in the context of if . . . then . . . else statements).
These tests involve syntactic descriptions of the events in the world, and allow us to
distinguish events from (syntactic) descriptions of events. In particular, there can be
two different descriptions that, intuitively, describe the same event from the point of
view of the modeler but may describe different events from the point of view of the
decision maker. Among other things, this enables us to capture framing effects in our
framework, without requiring states as Ahn and Ergin (2007) do, and provides a way
of dealing with resource-bounded reasoners.
In general, we do not include outcomes as part of the description of the deci-
sion problem; both states and outcomes are part of the DM’s (subjective) represen-
tation of the problem. We assume that the DM has a weak preference relation on the
objects of choice; we do not require the preference relation to be complete. The set
of acts for a decision problem is potentially huge, and may contain acts that will never
be considered by the DM. While we believe that empirical validity requires consider-
ing partial orders, there are also theoretical reasons for considering partial orders.
Our representation theorems for partial orders require a set of probabilities and utility
functions (where often one of the sets can be taken to be a singleton). Schmeidler
(1989, p. 572) observes that using a set of probability distributions can be taken as
a measure of a DM’s lack of confidence in her likelihood assessments. Similarly, a
set of utilities can be interpreted as a lack of confidence in her taste assessments
(perhaps because she has not had time to think them through carefully).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin the next section with
a description of the syntactic programs that we take as our objects of choice, discuss
several interpretations of the model, and show how syntactic programs can be inter-
preted as Savage acts. In Section 3, we present our assumptions on preferences
The key postulate is an analogue of Krantz et al.’s (1971) cancellation axiom. In Sec-
tion 4 we present our representation theorems for decision problems with subjective
outcomes and those with objective outcomes. Section 5 discusses how our frame-
work can model boundedly rational reasoning. In Section 6 we discuss how updating
works for new information about the external world as well as for new information
about preferences. Section 7 concludes.
42 Describing Choices
We begin by describing the language of tests, and then use this language to con-
struct our syntactic objects of choice. We then use the language of tests to describe
theories of the world. We show how framing problems can be understood as ‘odd’
theories held by decision makers.
2.1 Languages for tests and choices
A primitive test is a yes/no question about the world, such as, ‘IBM’s price-earnings
ratio is 5’, ‘the economy will be strong next year’ and ‘the moon is in the seventh
house’. We assume a finite set T0 of primitive tests. The set T of tests is constructed
by closing the set of primitive tests under conjunction and negation. That is, T is the
smallest set such that T0 ⊆ T , and if t1 and t2 are in T , so is t1 ∧ t2 and ¬t1. Thus,
the language of tests is just a propositional logic whose atomic propositions are the
elements of T0.
We consider two languages for choices. In both cases, we begin with a finite
set A0 of primitive choices. These may be objects such as ‘buy 100 shares of IBM’
or ‘buy $10,000 worth of bonds’. The interpretation of these acts is tightly bound to
the decision problem being modeled. The first language simply closes off A0 under
if . . . then . . . else. By this we mean that if t is a test in T and a and b are choices
in A, then if t then a else b is also a choice in A. When we need to be clear about
which T0 and A0 were used to construct A, we will write AA0,T0 . Note that A allows
nesting, so that if t1 then a else (if t2 then b else c) is also a choice.
The second languages closes off A0 with if . . . then . . . else and randomiza-
tion. That is, we assume that objective probabilities are available, and require that
for any 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, if a and b are choices, so is ra + (1− r)b. Randomization and if
. . . then . . . else can be nested in arbitrary fashion. We call this languageA+ (A+A0,T0
when necessary).
Tests in T are elements of discourse about the world. They could be events
upon which choice is contingent: If the noon price of Google stock today is below
$600, then buy 100 shares, else buy none. More generally, tests in T are part of the
DM’s description of the decision problem, just as states are part of the description
5of the decision problem in Savage’s framework. However, elements of T need not
be complete descriptions of the relevant world, and therefore may not correspond to
Savage’s states. When we construct state spaces, elements of T will clearly play a
role in defining states, but, for some of our representation theorems, states cannot
be constructed out of elements of T alone. Additional information in states is needed
for both incompleteness of preferences and when the outcome space is taken to be
objective or exogenously given.
The choices in A and A+ are syntactic objects; strings of symbols. They
can be given semantics—that is, they can be interpreted—in a number of ways. For
most of this paper we focus on one particular way of interpreting them that lets us
connect them to Savage acts, but we believe that other semantic approaches will
also prove useful (see Section 7). The first step in viewing choices as Savage acts is
to construct a state space S, and to interpret the tests as events (subsets of S). With
this semantics for tests, we can then construct, for the state space S and a given
outcome space O, a function ρSO that associates with each choice a a Savage act
ρSO(a), that is, a function from S to O. Given a state space S, these constructions
work as follows:
Definition 1. A test interpretation piS for the state space S is a function associating
with each test a subset of S. An interpretation is standard if it interprets ¬ and ∧ in
the usual way; that is
• piS(t1 ∧ t2) = piS(t1) ∩ piS(t2)
• piS(¬t) = S − piS(t).
Intuitively, piS(t) is the set of states where t is true. We will allow for nonstandard in-
terpretations. These are interpretations in which, for some test t, there may be some
state where neither t nor ¬t is true; that is, there may be some state in neither piS(t)
nor piS(¬t)); similarly, there may be some state where both t and ¬t are true. Such
nonstandard interpretations are essentially what philosophers call ‘impossible possi-
ble worlds’ (Rantala 1982); they have also been used in game theory for modeling
resource-bounded reasoning (Lipman 1999). A standard interpretation is completely
determined by its behavior on primitive tests. This is not true of nonstandard inter-
pretations. All test interpretations are assumed to be standard until Section 5. There
we motivate nonstandard interpretations, and show how our results can be modified
to hold even with them.
6Definition 2. A choice interpretation ρSO for the state space S and outcome space
O assigns to each choice a ∈ A a (Savage) act, that is, a function ρSO(a) : S → O.
Choice interpretations are constructed as follows: Let ρ0SO : A0 → OS be a choice
interpretation for primitive choices, which assigns to each ao ∈ A0 a function from
S → O. We extend ρ0SO to a function mapping all choices in A to functions from S to
O by induction on structure, by defining
ρSO(if t then a1 else a2)(s) =
{
ρSO(a1)(s) if s ∈ piS(t)
ρSO(a2)(s) if s /∈ piS(t). (1)
This semantics captures the idea of contingent choices; that, in the choice if t then
a1 else a2, the realization of a1 is contingent upon t, while a2 is contingent upon ‘not
t’. Of course, a1 and a2 could themselves be compound acts.
Extending the semantics to the language A+, given S, O, and piS , requires
us to associate with each choice a an Anscombe-Aumann (AA) act (Anscombe and
Aumann 1963), that is, a function from S to probability measures on O. Let ∆(O)
denote the set of probability measures on O and let ∆∗(O) be the subset of ∆(O)
consisting of the probability measures that put probability one on an outcome. Let
ρ0SO : A0 → ∆∗(O)S be a choice interpretation for primitive choices that assigns to
each ao ∈ A0 a function from S → ∆∗(O). Now we can extend ρ0SO by induction on
structure to all of A+ in the obvious way. For if . . . then . . . else choices we use (1);
to deal with randomization, define
ρSO(ra1 + (1− r)a2)(s) = rρSO(a1)(s) + (1− r)ρSO(a2)(s).
That is, the distribution ρSO(ra1 + (1 − r)a2)(s) is the obvious mixture of the dis-
tributions ρSO(a1)(s) and ρSO(a2)(s). Note that we require ρSO to associate with
each primitive choice in each state a single outcome (technically, a distribution that
assigns probability 1 to a single outcome), rather than an arbitrary distribution over
outcomes. So primitive choices are interpreted as Savage acts, and more general
choices, which are formed by taking objective mixtures of choices, are interpreted as
AA acts. This choice is largely a matter of taste. We would get similar representation
theorems even if we allowed ρ0SO to be an arbitrary function from A to ∆(O)S . How-
ever, this choice does matter for our interpretation of the results; see Example 11 for
further discussion of this issue.
72.2 Framing and equivalence
Framing problems appear when a DM solves inconsistently two decision problems
that are designed by the modeler to be equivalent or that are obviously similar after
recognizing an equivalence. The fact that choices are syntactic objects allows us to
capture framing effects.
Example 1. Consider the following well-known example of the effects of framing, due
to McNeil et al. (1982). DMs are asked to choose between surgery or radiation
therapy as a treatment for lung cancer. The problem is framed in two ways. In the
what is called the survival frame, DMs are told that, of 100 people having surgery, 90
live through the post-operative period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year, and 34
are alive at the end of five years; and of 100 people have radiation therapy, all live
through the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of the first year, and 22 are alive at
the end of five years. In the mortality frame, DMs are told that of 100 people having
surgery, 10 die during the post-operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year,
and 66 die by the end of five years; and of 100 people having radiation therapy, none
die during the treatment, 23 die by the end of the first year, and 78 die by the end of
five years. Inspection shows that the outcomes are equivalent in the two frames—90
of 100 people living is the same as 10 out of 100 dying, and so on. Although one
might have expected the two groups to respond to the data in similar fashion, this was
not the case. While only 18% of DMs prefer radiation therapy in the survival frame,
the number goes up to 44% in the mortality frame.
We can represent this example in our framework as follows. We assume that
we have the following tests:
• RT , which intuitively represents ‘100 people have radiation therapy’;
• S, which intuitively represents ‘100 people have surgery’;
• Li(k), for i = 0, 1, 5 and k = 0, . . . , 100, which intuitively represents that k out
of 100 people live through the post-operative period (if i = 0), are alive after
the first year (if i = 1), and are alive after five years (if i = 5);
• Di(k), for i = 0, 1, 5 and k = 0, . . . , 100, which is like Li(k), except ‘live/alive’
are replaced by ‘die/dead’.
8In addition, we assume that we have primitive programs aS and aR that represent
‘perform surgery’ and ‘perform radiation theory’. With these tests, we can character-
ize the description of the survival frame by the following test t1:
(S ⇒ L0(90) ∧ L1(68) ∧ L5(34)) ∧ (RT ⇒ L0(100) ∧ L1(77) ∧ L5(22)),
(where, as usual, t ⇒ t′ is an abbreviation for ¬(t ∧ ¬t′)); similarly, the mortality
frame is characterized by the following test t2:
(S ⇒ D0(10) ∧D1(32) ∧D5(66)) ∧ (RT ⇒ D0(0) ∧D1(23) ∧D5(78)).
The choices offered in the McNeil et al. experiment can be viewed as condi-
tional choices: what would a DM do conditional on t1 (resp., t2) being true. Using
ideas from Savage, we can capture the survival frame as a decision problem with the
following two choices:
if t1 then aS else a, and
if t1 then aR else a,
where a is an arbitrary choice. Intuitively, comparing these choices forces the DM
to consider his preferences between aS and aR conditional on the test, since the
outcome in these two choices is the same if the test does not hold. Similarly, the
mortality frame amounts to a decision problem with the analogous choices with t1
replaced by t2.
There is nothing in our framework that forces a DM to identify the tests t1 and
t2; the tests Li(k) and Di(100 − k) a priori are completely independent, even if the
problem statement suggests that they should be equivalent. Hence there is no rea-
son for a DM to identify the choices if t1 then aS else a and if t2 then aS else a. As a
consequence, as we shall see, it is perfectly consistent with our axioms that a DM has
the preferences if t1 then aS else a  if t1 then aR else a and if t2 then aR else a 
if t2 then aS else a.
We view it as a feature of our framework that it can capture this framing exam-
ple for what we view as the right reason: the fact that DMs do not necessarily identify
Li(k) and Di(100 − k). Nevertheless, we would also like to be able to capture the
fact that more sophisticated DMs do recognize the equivalence of these tests. We
can do this by associating with a DM her understanding of the relationship between
tests. For example, a sophisticated DM might understand that Li(k)⇔ Di(100− k),
9for i = 0, 1, 5 and k = 1, . . . , 100. Formally, we add to the description of a decision
problem a theory, that is, a set AX ⊆ T of tests. Elements of the theory are called
axioms.
Definition 3. A test interpretation piS for the state space S respects a theory AX iff
for all t ∈ AX, piS(t) = S.
A theory represents the DM’s view of the world; those tests he takes to be axiomatic
(in its plain sense). Different people may, however, disagree about what they take
to be obviously true of the world. Many people will assume that the sun will rise
tomorrow. Others, like Laplace, will consider the possibility that it will not.
Choices a and b are equivalent with respect to a set Π of test interpretations
if, no matter what interpretation pi ∈ Π is used, they are interpreted as the same
function. For example, in any standard interpretation, if t then a else b is equivalent
to if ¬¬t then a else b; no matter what the test t and choices a and b are, these
two choices have the same input-output semantics. The results of the McNeil et
al. experiment discussed in Example 1 can be interpreted in our language as a failure
by some DMs to have a theory that makes tests stated in terms of mortality data or
survival data semantically equivalent. This then allows choices, such as the choice
of surgery or radiation therapy given these tests, to be not seen as equivalent by
the DM. Thus, it is not surprising that such DMs are not indifferent between these
choices.
Definition 4. For a set Π of test interpretations, choices a and b are Π-equivalent,
denoted a ≡Π b, if for all state spaces S, outcomes O, test interpretations piS ∈ Π,
and choice interpretations ρSO, ρSO(a) = ρSO(b).
Denote by ΠAX the set of all standard interpretations that respect theory AX. Then
ΠAX -equivalent a and b are said to be AX-equivalent, and we write a ≡AX b. Note
that equivalence is defined relative to a given set Π of interpretations. Two choices
may be equivalent with respect to the set of all standard interpretations that hold a
particular test t to be true, but not equivalent to the larger set of all standard test
interpretations.
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3 The Axioms
This section lays out our basic assumptions on preferences. Since our basic frame-
work allows for preferences only on discrete sets of objects, we cannot use con-
ventional independence axioms. Instead, we use cancellation. Cancellation axioms
are not well known, so we use this opportunity to derive some connections between
cancellation and more familiar preference properties.
3.1 Preferences
We assume that the DM has a weak preference relation  on a subset C of the sets
A (resp., A+) of non-randomized (resp., randomized) acts. This weak preference
relation has the usual interpretation of ‘at least as good as’. We take a  b to be an
abbreviation for a  b and b6  a, even if  is not complete. We prove various rep-
resentation theorems that depend upon the language, and upon whether outcomes
are taken to be given or not. The engines of our analysis are various cancellation
axioms, which are the subject of the next section. At some points in our analysis we
consider complete preferences:
A1. The preference relation  is complete.
The completeness axiom has often been defended by the claim that ‘people, in the
end, make choices.’ Nonetheless, from the outset of modern decision theory, com-
pleteness has been regarded as a problem. Savage (1954, Section 2.6) discusses
the difficulties involved in distinguishing between indifference and incompleteness.
He concludes by choosing to work with the relationship he describes with the sym-
bol 5 ·, later abbreviated as ≤, which he interprets as ‘is not preferred to’. The
justification of completeness for the ‘is not preferred to’ relationship is anti-symmetry
of strict preference. Savage, Aumann (1962), Bewley (2002) and Mandler (2001)
argue against completeness as a requirement of rationality. Eliaz and Ok (2006)
have argued that rational choice theory with incomplete preferences is consistent
with preference reversals. In our view, incompleteness is an important expression of
ambiguity in its plain meaning (rather than as a synonym for a non-additive represen-
tation of likelihood). There are many reasons why a comparison between two objects
of choice may fail to be resolved: obscurity or indistinctness of their properties, lack
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of time for or excessive cost of computation, the incomplete enumeration of a choice
set, and so forth. We recognize indecisiveness in ourselves and others, so it would
seem strange not to allow for it in any theory of preferences that purports to describe
tastes (as opposed to a theory which purports to characterize consistent choice).
3.2 Cancellation
Axioms such as the independence axiom or the sure thing principle are required to
get the requisite linearity for an SEU representation. But in their usual form these
axioms cannot be stated in our framework as they place restrictions on preference
relations over acts and we do not have acts. Moreover, some of our representation
theorems apply to finite sets of acts, while the usual statement of mixture axioms
requires a mixture space of acts. For us, the role of these axioms is performed by
the cancellation axiom, which we now describe. Although simple versions of the
cancellation axiom have appeared in the literature (e.g. Scott (1964) and Krantz,
Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971)), it is nonetheless not well known, and so before
turning to our framework we briefly explore some of its implications in more familiar
settings. Nonetheless, some of the results here are new; in particular, the results on
cancellation for partial orders. These will be needed for proofs in the appendix.
Let C denote a set of choices and  a preference relation on C. We use the
following notation: Suppose 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 are sequences of elements
of C. If for all c ∈ C, #{j : aj = c} = #{j : bj = c}, we write {{a1, . . . an}} =
{{b1, . . . , bn}}. That is, the multisets formed by the two sequences are identical.
Definition 5 (Cancellation). The preference relation  on C satisfies cancellation iff
for all pairs of sequences 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 of elements of C such that
{{a1, . . . , an}} = {{b1, . . . , bn}}, if ai  bi for i ≤ n− 1, then bn  an.
Roughly speaking, cancellation says that if two collections of choices are identical,
then it is impossible to order the choices so as to prefer each choice in the first collec-
tion to the corresponding choice in the second collection. The following proposition
shows that cancellation is equivalent to reflexivity and transitivity. Although Krantz et
al. (1971, p. 251), Fishburn (1987, p. 743) have observed that cancellation implies
transitivity, this full characterization appears to be new.
Proposition 1. A preference relation  on a choice set C satisfies cancellation iff
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1.  is reflexive, and
2.  is transitive.
Proof. First suppose that cancellation holds. To see that  is reflexive, take n = 1
and a1 = b1 = a in the cancellation axiom. The hypothesis of the cancellation axiom
clearly holds, so we must have a  a. To see that cancellation implies transitivity,
consider the pair of sequences 〈a, b, c〉 and 〈b, c, a〉. Cancellation clearly applies. If
a  b and b  c, then cancellation implies a  c. We defer the proof of the converse
to the Appendix.
We use two strengthenings of cancellation in our representation theorems for
A and A+, respectively. The first, statewise cancellation, simply increases the set of
sequence pairs to which the conclusions of the axiom must apply. This strengthening
is required for the existence of additively separable preference representations when
choices have a factor structure. Here we state the condition for Savage acts. Given
are finite sets S of states and O of outcomes. A Savage act is a map f : S → O.
Let C denote a set of Savage acts and suppose that  is a preference relation on C.
Definition 6 (Statewise Cancellation). The preference relation  on a set C of Sav-
age acts satisfies statewise cancellation iff for all pairs of sequences 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and
〈b1, . . . , bn〉 of elements of C, if {{a1(s), . . . , an(s)}} = {{b1(s), . . . , bn(s)}} for all
s ∈ S, and ai  bi for i ≤ n− 1, then bn  an.
Statewise cancellation is a powerful assumption because equality of the multisets is
required only ‘pointwise’. Any pair of sequences that satisfy the conditions of can-
cellation also satisfies the conditions of statewise cancellation, but the converse is
not true. For instance, suppose that S = {s1, s2}, and we use (o1, o2) to refer
to an act with outcome oi in state i, i = 1, 2. Consider the two sequences of acts
〈(o1, o1), (o2, o2)〉 and 〈(o1, o2), (o2, o1)〉. These two sequences satisfy the conditions
of statewise cancellation, but not that of cancellation.
In addition to the conditions in Proposition 1, statewise cancellation directly
implies event independence, a condition at the heart of SEU representation theorems
(and which can be used to derive the Sure Thing Principle). If T ⊆ S, let aT b be the
Savage act that agrees with a on T and with b on S − T ; that is aT b(s) = a(s) if
s ∈ T and aT b(s) = b(s) if s /∈ T . We say that  satisfies event independence iff
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for all acts a, b, c, and c′ and subsets T of the state space S, if aT c  bT c, then
aT c
′  bT c′.
Proposition 2. If  satisfies statewise cancellation, then  satisfies event indepen-
dence.
Proof. Take 〈a1, a2〉 = 〈aT c, bT c′〉 and take 〈b1, b2〉 = 〈bT c, aT c′〉. Note that for each
state s ∈ T , {{aT c(s), bT c′(s)}} = {{a(s), b(s)}} =
{{bT c(s), aT c′(s)}}, and for each state s /∈ T , {{aT c(s), bT c′(s)}} =
{{c(s), c′(s)}} = {{bT c(s), aT c′(s)}}. Thus, we can apply statewise cancellation to
get that if aT c  bT c, then aT c′  bT c′.
Proposition 1 provides a provides a characterization of cancellation for choices in
terms of familiar properties of preferences. We do not have a similarly simple char-
acterization of statewise cancellation. In particular, the following example shows that
it is not equivalent to the combination of reflexivity and transitivity of  and event
independence.
Example 2. Suppose that S = {s1, s2}, O = {o1, o2, o3}. There are nine possible
acts. Suppose that  is the smallest reflexive, transitive relation such that
(o1, o1)  (o1, o2)  (o2, o1)  (o2, o2)  (o3, o1) 
(o1, o3)  (o2, o3)  (o3, o2)  (o3, o3),
using the representation of acts described above. To see that  satisfies event inde-
pendence, note that
• (x, o1)  (x, o2)  (x, o3) for x ∈ {o1, o2, o3};
• (o1, y)  (o2, y)  (o3, y) for y ∈ {o1, o2, o3}.
However, statewise cancellation does not hold. Consider the sequences
〈(o1, o2), (o2, o3), (o3, o1)〉 and 〈(o2, o1), (o3, o2), (o1, o3)〉.
This pair of sequences clearly satisfies the hypothesis of statewise cancellation, that
(o1, o2)  (o2, o1) and (o2, o3)  (o3, o2), but (o1, o3)6 (o3, o1).
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For our representation theorems for complete orders, statewise cancellation
suffices. However, for partial orders, we need a version of cancellation that is equiv-
alent to statewise cancellation in the presence of A1, but is in general stronger.
Definition 7 (Extended Statewise Cancellation). The preference relation  on a set
C of Savage acts satisfies extended statewise cancellation if and only if for all pairs
of sequences 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 of elements of C such that
{{a1(s), . . . , an(s)}} = {{b1(s), . . . , bn(s)}} for all s ∈ S, if there exists some k < n
such that ai  bi for i ≤ k, ak+1 = · · · = an, and bk+1 = · · · = bn, then bn  an.
Proposition 3. In the presence of A1, extended statewise cancellation and statewise
cancellation are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose the hypotheses of extended statewise cancellation hold. If bn 
an, we are done. If not, by A1, an  bn. But then the hypotheses of statewise
cancellation hold, so again, bn  an.
The extension of cancellation needed for A+ is based on the same idea
as extended statewise cancellation, but probabilities of objects rather than the in-
cidences of objects are added up. Let C denote a collection of elements from a
finite-dimensional mixture space. Thus, C can be viewed as a subspace of Rn for
some n, and each component of any c ∈ C is a probability. We can then formally
‘add’ elements of C, adding elements ofRn pointwise. (Note that the result of adding
two elements in C is no longer an element of C, and in fact is not even a mixture.)
Definition 8 (Extended Mixture Cancellation). The preference relation  on C sat-
isfies extended mixture cancellation iff for all pairs of sequences 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and
〈b1, . . . , bn〉 of elements of C, such that
∑n
i=1 ai =
∑n
i=1 bi, if there exists some
k < n such that ai  bi for i ≤ k, ak+1 = · · · = an, and bk+1 = · · · = bn, then
bn  an.
We can extend Proposition 1 to get a characterization theorem for preferences on
mixture spaces by using an independence postulate. The preference order  sat-
isfies mixture independence if for all a, b, and c in C, and all r ∈ (0, 1], a  b iff
ra + (1 − r)c  rb + (1 − r)c. The preference relation  satisfies rational mixture
independence if it satisfies mixture independence for all rational r ∈ (0, 1].
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Theorem 3. A preference relation  on a finite-dimensional mixture space C satis-
fies extended mixture cancellation iff  is reflexive, transitive, and satisfies rational
mixture independence.
Proof. Suppose that  satisfies extended mixture cancellation. Then it satisfies
cancellation, and so from Proposition 1,  is reflexive and transitive. To show that
 satisfies rational mixture independence, suppose that a  b and r = m/n. Let
a1 = · · · = am = a and am+1 = · · · = am+n = rb + (1− r)c; let b1 = · · · = bm = b
and bm+1 = · · · = bm+n = ra + (1 − r)c. Then
∑m+n
i=1 ai =
∑m+n
i=1 bi, and so
ra+ (1− r)c  rb+ (1− r)c.
Similarly, if ra + (1 − r)c  rb + (1 − r)c, then applying extended mixture
cancellation to the same sequence of acts shows that a  b.
For the converse, suppose that  is reflexive, transitive, and satisfies rational
mixture independence. Suppose that 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 are sequences of
of elements of C such that a1 + · · ·+ an = b1 + · · ·+ bn, ai  bi for i = 1, . . . , n− k,
ak+1 = . . . = an, and bk+1 = . . . = bn. Then from transitivity and rational mixture
independence we get that
1
n
(a1 + · · ·+ an)  1
n
(b1 + · · ·+ bk + ak+1 + · · ·+ an)
=
1
n
(b1 + · · ·+ bk) + n− k
n
an.
Since bk+1 = . . . = bn and a1 + · · ·+ an = b1 + · · ·+ bn, we have that
1
n
(b1 + · · ·+ bk) + n− k
n
(bn) =
1
n
(b1 + · · ·+ bn) = 1
n
(a1 + · · ·+ an).
Thus, by transitivity,
1
n
(b1 + · · ·+ bk) + n− k
n
(bn)  1
n
(b1 + · · ·+ bk) + n− k
n
(an).
By rational mixture independence, it follows that bn  an.
We can strengthen extended mixture cancellation just as we extended can-
cellation, by defining a statewise version of it appropriate for AA acts (i.e., functions
from S to ∆(O)). For completeness, we give the definition here:
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Definition 9 (Extended Statewise Mixture Cancellation). The preference relation 
on a set C of AA acts satisfies extended statewise mixture cancellation iff for all
pairs of sequences 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and b = 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 of elements of C, such that∑n
i=1 ai(s) =
∑n
i=1 bi(s) for all states s, if there exists some k < n such that ai  bi
for i ≤ k, ak+1 = · · · = an, and bk+1 = · · · = bn, then bn  an.
It turns out that we do not needed extended statewise mixture cancellation.
As the following result shows, it follows from extended mixture cancellation.
Proposition 4.  satisfies extended statewise mixture cancellation iff  satisfies
extended mixture cancellation.
Proof. Clearly if satisfies extended statewise mixture cancellation, then it satisfies
extended mixture cancellation. For the converse, suppose that  satisfies extended
mixture cancellation,
∑n
i=1 ai(s) =
∑n
i=1 bi(s) for all states s, there exists some
k < n such that ai  bi ak+1 = · · · = an, and bk+1 = · · · = bn. Then (1/n)a1) +
· · ·+ (1/n)an = (1/n)b1 + · · ·+ (1/n)bn. By rational mixture independence (which
follows from extended mixture cancellation, by Theorem 3), since a1  b1, we have
that (1/n)a1+· · ·+(1/n)an  (1/n)b1+(1/n)a2+· · ·+(1/n)an. By a straightforward
induction (using transitivity, which again follows from extended mixture cancellation),
it follows that
(1/n)b1 + · · ·+ (1/n)bk + ((n− k)/n)bn = (1/n)a1 + · · ·+ (1/n)an
 (1/n)b1 + · · ·+ (1/n)bk+
((n− k)/n)an.
Now from mixture independence, it follows that bn  an, as desired.
3.3 The cancellation postulate for choices
We use cancellation to get a representation theorem for preference relations on
choices. However, the definition of the cancellation postulates for Savage acts and
mixtures rely on (Savage) states. We now develop an analogue of this postulate for
our syntactic notion of choice.
Definition 10. Given a set T0 = {t1, . . . , tn} of primitive tests, an atom over T0 is a
test of the form t′1 ∧ . . . ∧ t′n, where t′i is either ti or ¬ti.
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An atom is a possible complete description of the truth value of tests accord-
ing to the DM. If there are n primitive tests in T0, there are 2n atoms. Let At(T0)
denote the set of atoms over T0. It is easy to see that, for all tests t ∈ T and atoms
δ ∈ At(T0), and for all state spaces S and standard test interpretations piS , either
piS(δ) ⊆ piS(t) or piS(δ)∩piS(t) = ∅. (The formal proof is by induction on the structure
of t.) We write δ ⇒ t if the former is the case. We remark for future reference that a
standard test interpretation is determined by its behavior on atoms. (It is, of course,
also determined completely by its behavior on primitive tests).
Definition 11. An atom δ (resp., test t) is consistent with a theory AX if there exists
a state space S and a test interpretation piS ∈ ΠAX such that piS(δ) 6= ∅ (resp.,
piS(t) 6= ∅). Let AtAX(T0) denote the set of atoms over T0 consistent with AX.
Intuitively, an atom δ is consistent with AX if there is some state in some state space
where δ might hold, and similarly for a test t.
A choice inA can be identified with a function from atoms to primitive choices
in an obvious way. For example, if a1, a2, and a3 are primitive choices and T0 =
{t1, t2}, then the choice a = if t1 then a1 else (if t2 then a2 else a3) can be identi-
fied with the function fa such that
• fa(t1 ∧ t2) = fa(t1 ∧ ¬t2) = a1;
• fa(¬t1 ∧ t2) = a2; and
• fa(¬t1 ∧ ¬t2) = a3.
Formally, we define fa by induction on the structure of choices. If a ∈ A0, then fa is
the constant function a, and
fif t then a else b(δ) =
{
fa(δ) if δ ⇒ t
fb(δ) otherwise.
We consider a family of cancellation postulates, relativized to the axiom sys-
tem AX. The cancellation postulate for AX (given the language A0) is simply state-
wise cancellation for Savage acts, with atoms consistent with AX playing the role of
states.
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A2′. If 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 are two sequences of choices in AA0,T0 such
that for each atom δ ∈ AtAX(T0), {{fa1(δ), . . . , fan(δ)}} = {{fb1(δ), . . . , fbn(δ)}},
and there exists some k < n such that ai  bi for all i ≤ k, ak+1 = · · · = an, and
bk+1 = · · · = bn, then bn  an.
We drop the prime, and refer to A2 when k = n− 1.
Axiom A2 implies the simple cancellation of the last section, and so the con-
clusions of Proposition 1 hold:  onA will be transitive and reflexive. A2 has another
consequence: a DM must be indifferent between AX-equivalent choices.
Proposition 5. Suppose that  satisfies A2. Then a ≡AX b implies a ∼ b.
Proof. Let S = AtAX(T0), the set of atoms consistent with AX, let O be A0, the set
of primitive choices, and define ρ0SO(c) to be the constant function c for a primitive
choice c. It is easy to see that ρSO(c) = fc for all choices c. If a ≡AX b, then
ρSO(a) = ρSO(b), so we must have fa = fb. Now apply A2 with a1 = a and b1 = b
to get b  a, and then reverse the roles of a and b.
Proposition 5 implies that the behavior of a and b on atoms not in AtAX(T0)
is irrelevant; that is, they are null in Savage’s sense. We define this formally:
Definition 12. A test t is null if, for all acts a, b and c, if t then a else c ∼ if t then b
else c.
An atom (or test) inconsistent with the theory AX is null, but consistent tests may be
null as well. The notion of a null test is suggestive of, more generally, test-contingent
preferences.
Definition 13. If t is a test in T , then for any acts a and b, a t b iff for some c,
if t then a else c  if t then b else c.
Proposition 2 shows that statewise cancellation implies that the choice of c is irrele-
vant, and so test-contingent preferences are well-defined.
To get a representation theorem for A+, we use a mixture cancellation pos-
tulate, again replacing states by atoms. The idea now is that we can identify each
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choice a with a function fa mapping atoms consistent with AX into distributions over
primitive choices. For example, if t is the only test in T0 and AX = ∅, then the choice
a = 1
2
a1 +
1
2
(if t then a2 else a3) can be identified with the function fa such that
• fa(t)(a1) = 1/2; fa(t)(a2) = 1/2
• fa(¬t)(a1) = 1/2; fa(¬t)(a3) = 1/2.
Formally, we just extend the definition of fa given in the previous section by defining
fra1+(1−r)a2(δ) = rfa1(δ) + (1− r)fa2(δ).
Consider the following cancellation postulate:
A2†. If 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 are two sequences of acts in A+A0,T0 such that
fa1(δ) + · · ·+ fan(δ) = fb1(δ) + · · ·+ fbn(δ)
for all atoms δ consistent with AX, and there exists k < n such that ai  bi for i ≤ k,
ak+1 = . . . = an, and bk+1 = . . . = bn, then bn  an.
Again, A2† can be viewed as a generalization of A2′.
A2† is analogous to extended statewise mixture cancellation. It may seem
strange that we need the cancellation to be statewise, since Proposition 4 shows
that extended statewise mixture cancellation is equivalent to extended mixture can-
cellation. This suggests that we might be able to get away with the following simpler
axiom:
A2∗. If 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 are two sequences of acts in A+A0,T0 such that
fa1 + · · ·+ fan = fb1 + · · ·+ fbn ,
and there exists k < n such that ai  bi for i = 1, . . . , k, ak+1 = . . . = an, and
bk+1 = . . . = bn, then bn  an.
A2∗ is implied by A2†, but they are not quite equivalent. To get equivalence, we
need one more property:
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EQUIV. If fa = fb, then a ∼ b.
EQUIV says that all that matters about a choice is how it acts as a function from tests
to primitive choices.
Proposition 6. A preference order  on choices satisfies A2† iff it satisfies A2∗ and
EQUIV.
Proof. If  satisfies A2†, then clearly  satisfies A2∗. To see that  satisfies
EQUIV, suppose that fa = fb. A straightforward argument by induction on the struc-
ture of a shows that, for all sets S of states, sets O of outcomes, test interpretations
piS , and choice interpretations ρSO, we have that ρSO(a)(s) = ρSO(fa(δ)), where δ is
the unique atom such that s ∈ piS(δ). Similarly, ρSO(b)(s) = ρSO(fb(δ)). Thus, since
fa = fb, ρSO(a) = ρSO(b). It follows that fa = fb implies a ≡ b. It now follows from
Proposition 5 that a ∼ b.
For the converse, since fa1 + · · · + fan = fb1 + · · · + fbn , it follows that
f1/n(a1)+···+1/n(an) = f1/n(b1)+···+1/n(bn). Applying EQUIV, we conclude that
1/n(a1) + · · ·+ 1/n(an) ∼ 1/n(b1) + · · ·+ 1/n(bn). We can now continue as in the
proof of Proposition 4.
4 Representation Theorems
Having discussed our framework, we now turn to the representation theorems. Our
goal is to be as constructive as possible. In this spirit we want to require that pref-
erences exist not for all possible acts that can be described in a given language, but
only for those in a given subset, henceforth designated C. We are agnostic about the
source of C. It could be the set of choices in one particular decision problem, or it
could be the set of choices that form a universe for a collection of decision problems.
One cost of our finite framework is that we will have no uniqueness results. In our
framework the preference representation can fail to be unique because of our free-
dom to choose different state and outcome spaces, but even given these choices, the
lack of richness of C may allow multiple representations of the same (partial) order.
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4.1 A Representation Theorem for A
By a representation for a preference order on A we mean the following:
Definition 14. A preference relation on a set C ⊆ AA0,T0 has a constructive AX-
consistent SEU representation iff there is a finite set of states S, a finite set O of
outcomes, a set U of utility functions u : O → R, a set P of probability distributions
on S, a subset V ⊆ U × P , a test interpretation piS consistent with AX, and a choice
interpretation ρSO such that a  b iff∑
s∈S
u
(
ρSO(a)(s)
)
p(s) ≥
∑
s∈S
u
(
ρSO(b)(s)
)
p(s) for all (u, p) ∈ V .
We are about to claim that  satisfies A2′ if and only if it has a constructive
AX-consistent representation. In the representation, we have a great deal of flexibility
as to the choice of the state space S and the outcome space O. One might have
thought that the space of atoms, AtAX(T0), would be a rich enough state space on
which to build representations. This is not true when preferences are incomplete. A
rich enough state space needs also to account for the incompleteness.
Definition 15. Given a partial order  on a set C of choices, let EXAX() denote
all the extensions of  to a total order on C satisfying A2.
Our proof shows that we can take S to be AtAX(T0) × EXAX(). Thus, in
particular, if is complete, then we can take the state space to be AtAX(T0). We later
give examples that show that if  is not complete then, in general, the state space
must have cardinality larger than that of AtAX(T0). While for some applications there
may be a more natural state space, our choice of state space shows that we can
always view the DM’s uncertainty as stemming from two sources: the truth values of
various tests (which are determined by the atom) and the relative order of two choices
not determined by (which is given by the extension ′ ∈ EXAX() of). The idea
of a DM being uncertain about her preferences is prevalent elsewhere in decision
theory; for instance, in the menu choice literature (Kreps 1979). This uncertainty
can be motivated in any number of ways, including both incomplete information and
resource-bounded reasoning.
Theorem 4. A preference relation  on a set C ⊆ AA0,T0 has a constructive AX-
consistent SEU representation iff  satisfies A2′. Moreover, in the representation,
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either P or U can be taken to be a singleton and, if U is a singleton {u}, the state
space can be taken to be AtAX(T0)× EXAX(). If, in addition,  satisfies A1, then
V can be taken to be a singleton (i.e., both P and U can be taken to be singletons).
Theorem 4 is proved in the appendix. The proof proceeds by first establishing a state-
dependent representation using A0 as the outcome space, and then, by changing
the outcome space, ‘bootstrapping’ the representation to an EU representation. This
technique shows that, when the state and outcome spaces are part of the represen-
tation, there is no difference between the formal requirement for a state-dependent
representation and that for a SEU representation. This does not mean that expected
utility comes ‘for free’; rather, we interpret it to mean that the beliefs/desires formalism
that motivates expected utility theory is sensible for the decision problems discussed
in this subsection only if the particular outcome space chosen for the representation
has some justification external to our theory. We note that if preferences satisfy A1,
the theorem requires only the cancellation axiom A2 rather than the stronger A2′.
There are no uniqueness requirements on P or U in Theorem 4. In part, this
is because the state space and outcome space are not uniquely determined. But
even if A1 holds, so that the state space can be taken to be the set of atoms, the
probability and the utility are far from unique, as the following example shows.
Example 5. Take A0 = {a, b}, T0 = {t}, and AX = ∅. Suppose that  is the
reflexive transitive closure of the following string of preferences:
a  if t then a else b  if t then b else a  b.
Every choice inA is equivalent to one of these four, so A1 holds, and we can take the
state space to be S∗ = {t,¬t}. Let O∗ = {o1, o2}, and define ρ0S∗O∗ so that ρ0S∗O∗(a)
is the constant function o1 and ρ0S∗O∗(b) is the constant function o2. Now define piS∗
in the obvious way, so that piS∗(t) = {t} and piS∗(¬t) = {¬t}. We can represent the
preference order by using any probability measure p∗ such that p∗(t) > 1/2 and any
utility function u∗ such that u∗(o1) > u∗(o2).
As Example 5 shows, the problem really is that the set of actions is not rich
enough to determine the probability and utility. By way of contrast, Savage’s postu-
lates ensure that the state space is infinite and that there are at least two outcomes.
Since the acts are all functions from states to outcomes, there must be uncountably
many acts in Savage’s framework.
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The next example shows that without the completeness axiom A1, there may
be no representation in which there is only one utility function and the state space is
AtAX(T0).
Example 6. Suppose that T0 = ∅, AX = ∅, and A0 (and hence A) consists of the
two primitive choices a and b, which are incomparable. In this case, the smallest
state space we can use has cardinality at least 2. For if |S| = 1, then there is only
one possible probability measure on S, and so a single utility function ranks a and b.
Since there is only one atom when there are no primitive propositions, we cannot take
the state space to be the set of atoms. There is nothing special about taking T0 = ∅
here; similar examples can be constructed showing that we cannot take the state
space to be AtAX(T0) for arbitrary choices of T0 if the preference order is partial. An
easy argument also shows that there is no representation where |O| = 1.
This preference relation can be represented with two outcomes and two states.
Let S = {s1, s2} and O = {o1, o2}. Define ρ0SO(a)(si) = oi, and ρ0SO(b)(si) = o2−i
for i = 1, 2. Let U contain a single function such that u(o1) 6= u(o2). Let P be any
set of probability measures including the measures p1 and p2 such that p1(s1) = 1
and p2(s1) = 0. Then the expected utility ranking of randomized acts under each
pi contains no nontrivial indifference, and the ranking under p2 is the reverse of that
under p1. Thus, these choices represent the preference order.
4.2 A Representation Theorem for A+
The purpose of this subsection is to show that for the language A+, we can get
something much in the spirit of the standard representation theorem for AA acts.
The standard representation theorem has a mixture independence axiom and an
Archimedean axiom. As we have seen, A2† gives us rational mixture independence;
it does not suffice for full mixture independence. To understand what we need, recall
that the standard Archimedean axiom for AA acts has the following form:
Arch. If a  b  c then there exist r, r′ ∈ (0, 1) such that a  ra + (1 − r)c  b 
r′a+ (1− r′)c  c.
While this axiom is both necessary for and implied by the existence of an SEU
representation when  is complete, the following example describes an incomplete
 with a multi-probability SEU representation which fails to satisfy Arch.
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Example 7. Suppose that S = {s1, s2, s3}. Let a1, a2, and a3 be acts such that
ai(sj) gives an outcome of 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Let P consist of all probability
distributions p on S such that p(s1) ≥ p(s2) ≥ p(s3). Define  by taking a  b
iff the expected outcome of a is at least as large as that of b with respect to all the
probability distributions in P . It is easy to see that a1  a2  a3, but for no r ∈ (0, 1)
is it the case that ra1 + (1 − r1)a3  a2 (consider the probability distribution p such
that p(s1) = p(s2) = 1/2).
We can think of the Archimedean axiom as trying to capture some continuity
properties of. We use instead the following axiom, which was also used by Aumann
(1962, 1964). If the set of tests has cardinality n and the set of primitive choices has
cardinality m, we can identify an act A+ with an element of R2nm, so the graph of 
can be viewed as a subset of R2
n+1m.
A3. The graph of the preference relation  is closed.
As the following result shows, in the presence of A2† (extended statewise
mixture cancellation), A3 implies full mixture independence. Moreover, if we also
assume A1, then A3 implies Arch. Indeed, it will follow from Theorem 8 that in
the presence of A1 and A2†, A3 and Arch are equivalent. On the other hand, it
seems that Arch does not suffice to capture independence if  is a partial order.
Summarizing, A3 captures the essential features of the Archimedean property, while
being more appropriate if  is only a partial order.
Proposition 7. (a) A2† and A3 imply full mixture independence.
(b) A1, A3, and extended mixture cancellation together imply Arch.
Proof. For part (a), suppose that a  b, and c is an arbitrary act. By Theorem 3,
rational mixture independence holds, so we have ra + (1 − r)c  rb + (1 − r)c
for all rational r. By A3, we have ra + (1 − r)c  rb + (1 − r)c for all real r.
Conversely, suppose that ra + (1 − r)c  rb + (1 − r)c for some real r. If r is
rational, it is immediate from rational mixture independence that a  b. If r is not
rational, choose a rational r′ such that 0 < r′ < r. Then we can find a sequence of
rational numbers rn such that rnr converges to r′. By rational mixture independence,
rn(ra+ (1− r)c) + (1− rn)c  rn(rb+ (1− r)c) + (1− rn)c. By A3, it follows that
r′a + (1 − r′)c  r′b + (1 − r′)c. Now by rational mixture independence, we have
a  b, as desired.
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For part (b), suppose that a  b  c. Mixture independence (which follows
from A2† and A3, as we have observed) implies that, for all r ∈ (0, 1), a  ra +
(1 − r)c. To see that ra + (1 − r)c  b for some r ∈ (0, 1), suppose not. Then, by
A1, b  ra+ (1− r)c for all r ∈ (0, 1), and by A3, we have that b  a, contradicting
our initial assumption. The remaining inequalities follow in a similar fashion.
Definition 16. A preference relation  on a set C ⊆ A+A0,T0 has a constructive AX-
consistent SEU representation iff there is a finite set of states S, a finite set O of
outcomes, a set U of utility functions u : O → R, a closed set P of probability
distributions on S, a closed set V ⊆ U × P , a test interpretation piS consistent with
AX, and a choice interpretation ρSO such that a  b iff∑
s,o
u(o)ρSO(a)(s)(o)p(s) ≥
∑
s,o
u(o)ρSO(b)(s)(o)p(s) for all (u, p) ∈ V .
In the statement of the theorem, if  is a preference relation on a mixture-
closed subset of A+A0,T0 , we use  ⊗ (a, b) to denote the smallest preference order
including  and (a, b) satisfying A2† and A3, and take EX+AX() to consist of all
complete preference orders extending  and satisfying A2† and A3.
Theorem 8. A preference relation  on a closed and mixture-closed set C ⊆ A+A0,T0
has a constructive AX-consistent SEU representation iff  satisfies A2† and A3.
Moreover, in the representation, either P or U can be taken to be a singleton and, if
U is a singleton {u}, the state space can be taken to be AtAX(T0)×EX+AX(). If, in
addition,  satisfies A1, then V can be taken to be a singleton.
As in the case of the language A, we cannot in general take the state space
to be the set of atoms. Specifically, if A0 consists of two primitive choices and
we take all choices in A+0 to be incomparable, then the same argument as in Ex-
ample 6 shows that we cannot take S to be At(T0), and there are no interesting
uniqueness requirements that we can place on the set of probability measures or
the utility function. On the other hand, if A1 holds, the proof of Theorem 8 shows
that, in the representation, the expected utility is unique up to affine transforma-
tions. That is, if (S,O, p, piS, ρ0SO, u) and (S
′, O′, p′, piS′ , ρ0S′O′ , u
′) are both repre-
sentations of , then there exist constants α and β such that for all acts a ∈ A+A0,T0 ,
Ep(u(ρSO(a))) = αEp′(u
′(ρS′O′(a))) + β.
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4.3 Objective Outcomes
In choosing, for instance, certain kinds of insurance or financial assets, there is a
natural, or objective, outcome space—in these cases, monetary payouts. To model
this, we take the set O of objective outcomes as given, and identify it with a subset
of the primitive acts A0. Call the languages with this distinguished set of outcomes
AA0,T0,O and A+A0,T0,O, depending on whether we allow randomization.
To get a representation theorem in this setting, we need to make some stan-
dard assumptions. The first is that there is a best and worst outcome; the second
is a state-independence assumption. However, this state-independence assumption
only applies to acts in O, but not to all acts.
A4. There are outcomes o1 and o0 such that for all non-null tests t, o1 t a t o0 for
all a ∈ A0.
A5. If t is not null and o, o′ ∈ O, then o  o′ iff o t o′.
In all our earlier representation theorems, it was possible to use a single utility
function. A4 and A5 do not suffice to get such a representation theorem. A nec-
essary condition to have a single utility function, if we also want utility to be state
independent, is that  restricted to O be complete.
A6.  restricted to O is complete.
While A5 and A6 are necessary to get a representation with a single utility
function, they are not sufficient, as the following example shows.
Example 9. Suppose that we have a language with one primitive test t, and three out-
comes, o0, o1, and o. Let a1 be if t then o0 else o1 and let a2 be if t then o1 else o0.
Let  be the smallest preference order satisfying A2′, A4, A5, and A6 (or A2†,
A3, A4, A5, and A6, if we are considering the language A+) such that o ∼ a1
and o1  o0. Note that a1 and a2 are incomparable according to . Suppose that
there were a representation of  involving a set P of probability measures and a
single utility function u. Thus, there would have to be probability measures p1 and
p2 in P such that a1  a2 according to (p1, u) and a2  a1 according to (p2, u). It
easily follows that p1(piS(t)) < 1/2 and p2(piS(t)) > 1/2. We can assume without
loss of generality (by using an appropriate affine transformation) that u(o0) = 0 and
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u(o1) = 1. Since o ∼ a1, u(o) must be the same as the expected utility of a1. But
this expected utility is less than 1/2 with p1 and more than 1/2 with p2. This gives the
desired contradiction.
Part of the problem is that it is not just the acts in O that must be state inde-
pendent. Let O+ be the smallest set of acts containing O that is closed under convex
combinations, so that if o and o′ are in O+, then so is ro + (1 − r)o′. Let A5+ and
A6+ be the axioms that result by replacing O by O+ in A5 and A6, respectively.
Example 9 actually shows that A5+ and A6 do not suffice to get a single utility func-
tion; Theorem 10 shows that A5+ and A6+ do, at least for A+. We do not have a
representation theorem forA, and believe it will be hard to obtain such a theorem (for
much the same reasons that it is hard to get a representation theorem in the Savage
setting if we restrict to a finite set of acts).
Theorem 10. A preference relation on a set C ⊆ A+A0,T0,O has a constructive SEU
representation with outcome space O iff  satisfies A2†, A3, A4, A5+, and A6+.
Moreover, in the representation, U can be taken to be a singleton {u} and the state
space can be taken to have the form AtAX(T0) × A0 × EX+AX(). If in addition 
satisfies A1, then we can take V to be a singleton too.
Note that, even if satisfiesA1, the state space has the form AtAX(T0)×A0.
The fact that we cannot take the state space to be AtAX(T0) is a consequence of our
assumption that primitive acts are deterministic. Roughly speaking, we need the
extra information in states to describe our uncertainty regarding how the primitive
acts not in O can be viewed as functions from states to outcomes in the pre-specified
set O. The following example shows that we need the state space to be larger than
AtAX(T0) in general.
Example 11. Suppose that there are no primitive proposition, so AtAX(T0) is a sin-
gleton. There are three primitive acts in A0: o1 = $50000, o0 = $0, and a, which is
interpreted as buying 100 shares of Google. Suppose that o1  a  o0. If there were
a representation with only one state, then ρSO(a) would have to be either o1 or o0,
which would imply that a ∼ o1 or a ∼ o0, contradicting our description of . The is-
sue here is our requirement that a primitive choice be represented as a function from
states to outcomes. If we could represent a as a lottery, there would be no problem
representing  with one state. We could simply take u(o1) = 1, u(o0) = 0, and take
a to be a lottery that gives each of o0 and o1 with probability 1/2.
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We prefer not to allow the DM to consider such ‘subjective’ lotteries. Rather,
we have restricted the randomization to acts. The representation theorem would not
change if we allowed primitive choice to map a state to a distribution over outcomes,
rather than requiring them to be mappings from states to single outcomes (except
that we could take the state space to be AtAX(T0)).
We can easily represent  using two states, s0 and s1, by taking a to be the
act with outcome oi in state si, for i = 0, 1. Taking each of s0 and s1 to hold with
probability 1/2 then gives a representation of . In this representation, we can view
s0 as the state where buying Google is a good investment, and s1 as the state where
buying Google is a bad investment. However, the DM cannot talk about Google
being a good investment; this is not part of his language. Another DM might explicitly
consider the test that Google is a good investment. Suppose this DM has the same
preference relation over primitive acts as in the example, is indifferent between 100
shares of Google and o1 if the test is true, and is indifferent between 100 shares of
Google and o0 if the test is false. This DM’s preference order has exactly the same
representation as the first DM’s preference order, but now s0 can be viewed as the
atom where the test is false, and s1 can be viewed as the atom where the test is true.
The second DM can reason about Google being a good investment explicitly, and
can talk to others about it.
5 Nonstandard Hypothesis Interpretations
Many framing problems can be viewed as failures of extensionality, the principle that
says that two equivalent descriptions of the same decision problem should lead to
the same choices. While this axiom seems appealing, it often fails in laboratory
tests. Different descriptions of the same events often give rise to different judgments.
Perhaps the best-known example is the medical treatment experiment considered in
Example 1, but there are many others. For example, Johnson et al. (1993) found that
subjects offered hypothetical health insurance were willing to pay a higher premium
for policies covering hospitalization for any disease or accident than they were for
policies covering hospitalization for any reason at all.
But what makes two descriptions of events equivalent? In summarizing fail-
ures of extensionality, Tversky and Koehler (1994, p. 548) conclude that ‘. . . probability
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judgments are attached not to events but to descriptions of events.’ In our frame-
work, events are described by tests. Whether two sets of tests are recognized by
a DM as semantically equivalent is determined by her world view, that is, her the-
ory AX. For instance, suppose that this year’s discussion of the failure of the New
York Yankees baseball team involves the hypothesis t1, ‘they failed because of a
weak defense.’ One would have to know more baseball than some of our readers
surely do to understand that t1 is equivalent to t2 ∨ t3, where t2 is ‘they had bad
pitching’, and t3 is ‘they have poor fielding’. Suppose that a DM must make some
decisions to remedy the failures of this year’s team. How might her decision problem
be represented? If t1 ⇔ t2 ∨ t3 is not part of her theory, then the DM’s decision
problem might be represented by a state space S and a test interpretation piS such
that piS(t1) 6= piS(t2) ∪ piS(t3). On the other hand, if her knowledge of baseball is
sufficiently refined (as has often been the case for those actually making such deci-
sions), then t1 ⇔ t2 ∨ t3 will be part of her theory, and so for any state space S and
test interpretation pis ∈ ΠAX , piS(t1) = piS(t2) ∪ piS(t3).
We are not taking a stand on the normative implications of extensionality fail-
ures. Our point is that extensionality and its failure is a product of the theory of the
world AX that a DM brings to the decision problem at hand (and how it compares
to the experimenter’s or modeler’s view of the world). One can extend conventional
expected utility to state spaces and act spaces that admit failures of extensionality. A
failure of extensionality is not inconsistent with the existence of an SEU representa-
tion on a suitably constructed state space. Moreover, if we modelers take t0 ⇔ t1 to
be an axiom that describes the world, but our DM disagrees, then the probability of
the set (piS(t0)/piS(t1)) ∪ (piS(t1)/piS(t0)) measures the degree of framing bias from
the modeler’s point of view. It could be used in a modeling exercise to qualify the
effect of framing failures in particular decision problems, and in empirical studies to
measure the degree of framing bias.
Failures of extensionality are concerned with a semantic issue: Identifying
when two descriptions of an event are equivalent. However, the same issue arises
with respect to logical equivalence. For instance, suppose act a gives a DM x if
¬((¬t1 ∧ ¬t3) ∨ (¬t2 ∧ ¬t3)) is true, and y otherwise, and act b gives the DM x if
(t1∧t2)∨t3 is true, and y otherwise. Only someone adept at formula manipulation (or
with a good logic-checking program) will recognize that acts a and b are equivalent
as a matter of logic because the equivalence of the two compound propositions is a
tautology. So far we have required that DMs be logically omniscient, and recognize
all such tautologies, because we have considered only standard interpretations.
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An interpretation piS on a state space S does not have to be standard; all that
is required is that it associate with each test a subset of S. By allowing nonstan-
dard test interpretations, we can back off from our requirement that DM’s know all
tautologies. This gives us a way of modeling failures of logical omniscience and, in
particular, resource-bounded reasoning by DMs.
Recall that a standard test interpretation is completely determined by its be-
havior on the primitive tests. However, in general, there is no similar finite character-
ization of a nonstandard test interpretation. To keep things finite, when dealing with
nonstandard interpretations, we assume that there is a finite subset T ∗ of the set T
of all tests such that the only tests that appear in choices are those in T ∗. (This is
one way to model resource-bounded reasoning.) With this constraint, it suffices to
consider the behavior of a nonstandard interpretations only on the tests in T ∗. Let
AA0,T ∗ consist of all choices whose primitive choices are in A0 and whose tests are
all in T ∗.
The restriction to choices in AA0,T ∗ allows us to define the cancellation pos-
tulate in a straightforward way even in the presence of nonstandard interpretations.
A truth assignment to T ∗ is just a function v : T ∗ → {true, false}. We can identify
an interpretation on S with a function that associates with every state s ∈ S the truth
assignment vs such that vs(t) = true iff s ∈ pi(t). For a standard interpretation,
we can use an atom instead of a truth assignment, since for a standard interpreta-
tion, the behavior of each truth assignment is determined by its behavior on primitive
propositions, and we can associate with the truth assignment vs that atom δs such
that t is a conjunct in δs iff vs(t) = true. These observations suggest that we can
consider truth assignments the generalization of atoms once we move to nonstan-
dard interpretations. Indeed, if we do this, we can easily generalize all our earlier
theorems.
In more detail, we now view a choice as a function, not from atoms to prim-
itive choices, but, more generally, as a function from truth assignments to primitive
choices. As before, we take primitive choices to be constant functions. The choice
a = if t1 then a1 else (if t2 then a2 else a3) can be identified with the function fa
such that
fa(v) =
{
a1 if v(t1) = true
fif t2 then a2 else a3 if v(t1) = false
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and
fif t2 then a2 else a3 =
{
a2 if v(t2) = true
a3 if v(t2) = false.
A truth assignment v is consistent with AX if v(t) = true for all tests t ∈ AX.
With these definitions in hand, all our earlier results hold, with the following
changes:
• we replace AA0,T0 by AA0,T ∗ ;
• we replace ‘atoms δ over T0’ by ‘truth assignment to T ∗’.
The cancellation axioms are all now well defined. With these changes, Proposition 5
and Theorems 4, 8, and 10 hold with essentially no changes in the proof. Thus, we
have representation theorems that apply even to resource-bounded reasoners.
6 Updating
There is nothing unique about the state space chosen for an SEU representation of
a given choice problem. Our representation theorems state that if an SEU represen-
tation exists on any given state space and outcome space with test and choice inter-
pretation functions, then preferences satisfy the appropriate cancellation and other
appropriate axioms. Our proofs, however, show that (for standard interpretations) we
can always represent a choice situation on the state space AtAX(T0)×EXAX(), or
AtAX(T0)×A0 × EXAX() for the objective-outcomes case, so this construction is
in some sense canonical.
In our models there are two kinds of information. A DM can learn more about
the external world, that is, learn the results of some tests. A DM can also learn more
about her internal world, that is, she can learn more about her preferences. This
learning takes the form of adding more comparisons to her (incomplete) preference
order. To make this precise, given a preference order  on a set C ⊆ AA0,T0 sat-
isfying A2′, let  ⊕ (a, b) be the smallest preference order including  and (a, b)
satisfying A2′. (There is such a smallest preference order, since it is easy to see that
if ′ and ′′ both extend , include (a, b), and satisfy A2′, then so does ′ ∩ ′′.)
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If we take the state space to be AtAX(T0) × EXAX(), then a DM’s prefer-
ence order conditioning on either new test information or new comparison information
can be represented by conditioning the original probability measures. If P is a set
of probability distributions on some set S and E is a measurable subset of S, let
P | E = {q : q = p( · |E) for some p ∈ P with p(E) > 0}. That is, in computing
P | E, we throw out all distributions p such that p(E) = 0, and then apply standard
conditioning to the rest. Let P | t = P | piS(t). In the theorems below, we condition
on a test t and on a partial order ′ extending . We are implicitly identifying t with
the event {δ ∈ AtAX(T0) : δ ⇒ t}, and ′ with the set of total orders in EXAX()
extending .
Theorem 4c. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, and with a representation of 
in which S = AtAX(T0) × EXAX() and U is a singleton {u}, t is represented by
P | t and u, and  ⊕ (a, b) is represented by P | ( ⊕ (a, b)) and u.
Theorem 8c. Under the assumptions of Theorem 8, and with a representation of 
in which S = AtAX(T0) × EX+AX() and U is a singleton {u}, t is represented by
P | t and {u}, and  ⊗ (a, b) is represented by P | ( ⊗ (a, b)) and u.
Theorem 10c. Under the assumptions of Theorem 10, and with a representation of
in which S = AtAX(T0)×A0×EX+AX() and U is a singleton {u},t is represented
by P | t and u, and  ⊗ (a, b) is represented by P | ( ⊗ (a, b)) and u.
Information in the external world is modeled as a restriction on the set of fea-
sible acts; information in the internal world is adding comparisons to a the preference
order. These theorems show that both kinds of information can be modeled within a
Bayesian paradigm.
7 Conclusion
Our formulation of decision problems has several advantages over more traditional
formulations.
• We theorize about only the actual observable choices available to the DM,
without having states and outcomes, and without needing to view choices as
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functions from states to outcomes. Indeed, we show that we can determine
whether a DM’s behavior is consistent with SEU despite not having states and
outcomes. In contrast, in many decision theory experiments, when the DM
is given a word problem, the experimenter has an interpretation of this prob-
lem as a choice among Savage acts. The experimenter is then really testing
whether the DM’s choices are consistent with decision theory given this inter-
pretation. Thus, a joint hypothesis is being tested. Standard decision theory
can be rejected only if the other part of the joint test—that the experimenter
and DM interpret represent the word problem with identical Savage acts—is
maintained as true. This is unsatisfactory. As we have shown, our approach
does place restrictions on choice; thus, our model can be rejected directly by
observations of choice between choices observable by the experimenter.
• By viewing choices as syntactic objects, our approach allows us to consider
DMs that associate different meanings to the same object of choice. Moreover,
that meaning can depend on the DM’s theory of the world. A DM might have a
theory that does not recognize equivalences between tests, and thus choices,
that may be obvious to others. This potential difference between a DM’s theory
of the world and an experimenter’s view of the world provides an explanation
for framing effects, while still allowing us to view a DM as an expected util-
ity maximizer. Moreover, since a DM’s theory may not contain all of standard
propositional logic, we can model resource-bounded DMs who cannot discern
all the logical consequences of their choices. The existence of an SEU rep-
resentation and the presence of framing effects are independent issues once
one is free to choose a state space. We have modeled framing as a semantic
issue, and it appears in the relationship between states of the world and state-
ments about the world in the DMs language. This refutes the unwritten but
oft voiced implication that in the presence of extensionality failures, decision
theory is irrelevant.
• Our approach allows us to consider different DMs who use different languages
to describe the same phenomena. To see why this might be important, con-
sider two decision makers who are interested in 100 shares of Google stock
and money (as in Example 11). Suppose that one DM considers quantitative
issues like price/earnings ratio to be relevant to the future value of Google,
while the other considers astrological tables relevant to Google’s future value.
The DM who uses astrology might not understand price/earnings ratios (the no-
tion is simply not in his vocabulary) and, similarly, the DM who uses quantitative
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methods might not understand what it means for the moon to be in the seventh
house. Nevertheless, they can trade Google stock and money, as long as they
both have available primitive actions like ‘buy 100 shares of Google’ and ‘sell
100 shares of Google’. If we model these decision problems in the Savage
framework, we would have to think of assets as Savage acts on a common
state and outcome space. Our approach does not require us to tie the DM’s
decision problems together with a common state space. Every DM acts as if
she has a state space, but these state spaces may be different. Thus, agreeing
to disagree results (Aumann 1976), which say that DMs with a common prior
must have a common posterior (they cannot agree to disagree) no longer hold.
• A fourth advantage of our approach is more subtle but potentially profound.
Representation theorems are just that; they merely provide a description of
a preference order in terms of numerical scales. Decision theorists make no
pretense that these representations have anything to do with the cognitive pro-
cesses by which individuals make decisions. But to the extent that the lan-
guage of choices models the language of the DM, we have the ability to inter-
pret the effects of cognitive limitations having to do with the language in terms
of the representation. Our approach allows us to consider the possibility that
there may be limitations on the space of choices because some sequence of
tests is too computationally costly to verify. Our model of nonstandard test in-
terpretations also takes into account a DM’s potential inability to recognize that
two choices logically represent the same function.
There is clearly still much more to do to develop our approach. We briefly
mention a few topics here.
• Learning and dynamic decision-making: Our focus has been on static deci-
sion making. Dealing with decision-making over time will require us to consider
learning in more detail. Learning in our framework is not just a matter of con-
ditioning, but also learning about new notions (i.e., becoming aware of new
tests). Note that considering dynamic decision-making will require us to take
a richer collection of objects of choice, a programming language that allows
(among other things) sequential actions (do this, then do that, then do that).
• Multi-agent decision making: We have focused on the single-agent case.
As we have suggested in examples, once we move to a multi-agent case,
we can consider different agents who may use different languages. There
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is clearly a connection here between our framework and the burgeoning lit-
erature on awareness and its applications to game theory (see, for exam-
ple, (Feinberg 2004, Fagin and Halpern 1988, Halpern 2001, Halpern and
Rêgo 2006, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006, Modica and Rustichini 1999)
that needs to be explored.
• Modeling other ‘deviations’ from rationality: We have shown how our ap-
proach can model framing problems as a consequence of the agent having
a different theory from the modeler. We believe that our approach can also
model other ‘deviations’ from rationality of the type reported by Luce (1990),
which can be viewed as a consequence of an agent’s bounded processing
power. This will require us to be able to distinguish programs such as, for ex-
ample, 2/3(1/4a + 3/4b) + 1/3c = 1/6a + 5/6(3/5b + 2/5c). To do that, we
need to give semantics to choices that does not view them as functions from
states to distributions over outcomes.
The strategy of ‘constructive decision theory’ is to use a language to model the DMs
statements about the world rather than to insist on Savage’s states, construct choices
from a given set of primitive objects of choice and propositions in the language, and
then to provide semantics for the language and objects of choice in terms of (subjec-
tive) states and outcomes. We applied this strategy to choice under uncertainty, but
we believe it can be usefully employed in other domains of choice as well, such as
intertemporal decision making and interpersonal choice.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We need to prove the converse part of the proposition. For
the converse, suppose that  is reflexive and transitive. By way of contradiction,
suppose that 〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 are two sequences of minimal cardinality
n that violate cancellation; that is, {{a1, . . . , an}} = {{b1, . . . , bn}}, ai  bi for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, and it is not the case that bn  an
If n = 1, and {{a}} = {{b}}, then we must have a = b, and the cancellation
postulate holds iff a  a, which follows from our assumption that  is reflexive.
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If n > 1, since the two multisets are equal, there must be some permutation
τ of {1, . . . , n} such that aτ(i) = bi. Let τ j(1) be the result of applying τ j times,
beginning with 1. Let k be the first integer such that τ k+1(1) is either 1 or n. Then we
have the situation described by the following table, where the diagonal arrow denotes
equality.
a1  b1
↙
aτ(1)  bτ(1)
↙
...
...
↙
aτk(1)  bτk(1)
Note that we must have k ≤ n− 1. If τ k+1(1) = 1, then bτk(i) = a1. Thus, the multi-
sets {{a1, . . . , aτk(1)}} and {{b1, . . . , bτk(1)}}must be equal. The sequences that re-
main after removing {{a1, . . . , aτk(1)}} from the first sequence and {{b1, . . . , bτk(1)}}
from the second also provide a counterexample to the cancellation axiom, contradict-
ing the minimality of n. Thus, τ k+1(1) = n, and we can conclude by transitivity that
a1  an.
Continuing on with the iteration procedure starting with aτk+2(1) = aτ(n) = bn,
we ultimately must return to a1 and b1, as illustrated in the following table: a1 and b1.
bn = aτk+1(1)  bτk+1(1)
↙
...
...
↙
aτ l(1)  bτ1(1) → a1
It follows from transitivity that bn  a1. By another application of transitivity, we
conclude that bn  an. This contradicts the hypothesis that the original sequence
violated the cancellation axiom.
We now prove the representation theorems: Theorems 4, 8, and 10. They
all use essentially the same technique. It is convenient to start with Theorem 8.
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The first step is to get an additively separable utility representation for AA acts on
a state space S with outcome space O. This result is somewhat novel because we
use extended mixture cancellation and A3 rather than independence and Arch, and
because  can be incomplete.
Theorem 12. A preference relation  on a set C of mixture-closed AA acts map-
ping a finite set S of states to distributions over a finite set O of outcomes satisfies
Extended Mixture Cancellation and A3 iff there exists a set U of utility functions on
S ×O such that a  b iff∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
u(s, o)a(s)(o) ≥
∑
s∈S
∑
o∈O
u(s, o)b(s)(o) (2)
for all u ∈ U . Moreover,  also satisfies A1 iff we can take U to be a singleton {u}.
In this case, u is unique up affine transformations: if u′ also satisfies (2), then there
exist α and β such that u′ = αu+ β.
Proof. In the totally ordered case, this result is well known. Indeed, for a prefer-
ence order  that satisfies A1, Proposition 7.4 of (Kreps 1988) shows that such a
representation holds iff  satisfies Arch, mixture independence, transitivity, and re-
flexivity. Theorem 3 and Proposition 7 show that if  satisfies extended cancellation
and A3, then these properties hold, so there is a representation. Conversely, if there
is such a representation, then all these properties are easily seen to hold. It follows
that in the presence of A1, extended cancellation and A3 are equivalent to these
properties. However, since we do not want to assume A1, we must work a little
harder. Fortunately, the techniques we use will be useful for our later results.
To see that the existence of a representation implies Extended Mixture Can-
cellation and A3, first consider Extended Mixture Cancellation, and suppose that
〈a1, . . . , an〉 and 〈b1 . . . , bn〉 are such that a1  b1, . . . , ak  bk, ak+1 = . . . = an,
bk+1 = · · · = bn, and a1 + · · · + an = b1 + · · · + bn. For all u ∈ U , for i = 1, . . . , k,
we have ∑
s∈S
u(s, ai(s)) ≥
∑
s∈S
u(s, bi(s)).
Since a1 + · · ·+ an = b1 + · · ·+ bn, for all s ∈ S, it must be that, for all u ∈ U ,
n∑
i=1
∑
s∈S
u(s, ai(s)) =
n∑
i=1
∑
s∈S
u(s, bi(s)).
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Thus, for all u ∈ U ,
n∑
i=k+1
∑
s∈S
u(s, ai(s)) ≤
n∑
i=k+1
∑
s∈S
u(s, bi(s)).
Since ak+1 = . . . = an and bk+1 = . . . = bn, it easily follows that, for all u ∈ U ,∑
s∈S
u(s, an(s)) ≤
∑
s∈S
u(s, bn(s)).
Thus bn  an, as desired. The fact that A3 holds is straightforward, and left to the
reader.
For the ‘if’ direction, recall that we can view the elements of C as vectors in
R|S|×|O|. For the rest of this proof, we identify elements of C with such vectors. Let
D = {a− b : a, b ∈ C}, and let D+ = {a− b : a  b}. Recall that a (pointed) cone
in R|S|×|O| is a set CC that is closed under nonnegative linear combinations, so that
if c1, c2 ∈ CC and α, β ≥ 0, then αc1 + βc2 ∈ CC. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists a closed convex cone CC such that D+ = CC ∩D.
Proof. Let CC consist of all vectors of the form α1d1 + · · · + αndn for some n >
0, where d1, . . . , dn ∈ D+ and α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0. Clearly CC is a convex cone,
and closed because D+ is finite. Also, D+ ⊆ CC ∩ D. For the opposite inclu-
sion, suppose that α1d1 + · · · + αndn = d, where d1, . . . , dn ∈ D+, d ∈ D, and
α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0. Thus, there must exist a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, a, b ∈ C such that
a− b = d, ai − bi = di, and ai  bi for i = 1, . . . , n. We want to show that d ∈ D+
or, equivalently, that a  b. Let r = α1 + · · ·+αn+1. Since C is mixture-closed, both
(α1/r)a1+· · ·+(αn/r)an+(1/r)b ∈ C and (α1/r)b1+· · ·+(αn/r)bn+(1/r)a are in
C. Moreover, since α1d1+· · ·+αndn = d and ai  bi for i = 1, . . . , n, it easily follows
from mixture independence (which is a consequence of extended mixture cancella-
tion) that (α1/r)b1 + · · ·+(αn/r)bn+(1/r)a = (α1/r)a1 + · · ·+(αn/r)an+(1/r)b 
(1/r)b1 + · · ·+ (1/r)bn + (1/r)b. Another application of mixture independence gives
us a  b, as desired.
Returning to the proof of Theorem 12, note that if a  b for all a and b, then
D+ = D, and we can take CC to be the whole space. If  is nontrivial, then CC is
not the whole space. It is well known (Rockafellar 1970) that every closed cone that
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is not the whole space is the intersection of closed half-spaces (where a half-space is
characterized by a vector u such and consists of all the vectors x such that u ·x ≥ 0).
Given our identification of elements of C with vectors, we can identify the vector u in
R|S|×|O| characterizing a half-space with a (state-dependent) utility function, where
u(s, o) is the (s, o) component of the vector u. If CC is the whole space, we can
get a representation by simply taking U to consist of the single utility function such
that u(s, o) = 0 for all (s, o) ∈ S × O. Otherwise, we can take U to consist of the
utility functions characterizing the half-spaces containing CC . It is easy to see that
for a, b ∈ C, we have that a  b iff a − b ∈ D+ iff a − b ∈ CC iff u · (a − b) ≥ 0 for
every half-space u containing CC ; i.e. iff (2) holds.
To prove Theorem 8, the following lemma, which shows that we can identify
complete preference orders with half-spaces, is also useful. Given a subset R of
R|S|×|O|, define the relation R on C by taking a R b iff a− b ∈ R.
Lemma 2. EXAX = {R: R is either a half-space containing CC or the full space}.
Proof. IfR is the full space, thenR is the trivial relation, so clearlyR ∈ EXAX().
If R is a half-space H containing CC and H is characterized by u, then H extends
, since CC ⊆ H . To see that H satisfies A1, observe that if (a, b) /∈H , then
u · (a − b) < 0, so u · (b − a) > 0, and b H a. To see that H satisfies A2′,
suppose that a1 + · + an = b1 + · + bn, and ai H bi for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Thus,
u · (a1 + ·+ an) = u · (b1 + ·bn), and u · (ai − bi) ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1. It follows
that (bn− an) · u ≥ 0, so bn H an. Finally, for A3, it is clear that if (an, bn)→ (a, b),
and u · (an − bn) ≥ 0, then u · (a− b) ≥ 0, so a H b. Thus, H ∈ EXAX().
For the opposite inclusion, suppose that′ ∈ EXAX(). Let CC ′ be the cone
determined by ′, as in Lemma 1. Clearly CC ⊆ CC ′. If CC ′ is the full space, then
we are done, since ′=CC ′ . Otherwise, CC ′ is the intersection of half-spaces.
Choose a half-space H such that CC ′ ⊆ H . We claim that ′=H . Suppose not.
Since CC ′ ⊆ H , we must have′⊆H . There must exist a, b ∈ C such that a H b
and a6 ′b. Since ′ is complete, we must have b ′ a. Thus, b H a, so a ∼H b.
Since H is not the full space, there must be some c such that b 6∼Hc. Suppose that
c H b. We must have c  b, since otherwise b ′ c, and it follows that b ∼H c. By
the Archimedean property (which holds by Proposition 7), since c ′ b ′ a, there
exists r > 0 such that b ′ rc+(1−r)a. Thus we must have b H rc+(1−r)a H b.
But this contradicts the assumption that c H b ∼H a. We get a similar contradiction
if b H c, since then a H c.
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Proof of Theorems 8 and 8c. It is easy to check that if there is a constructive SEU
representation of , then  satisfies A2† and A3.
For the converse, suppose that  satisfies A2† and A3. Take S = AtAX(T0)
and O′ = A0. Define piS(t) to be the set of all atoms δ in AtAX(T0) such that δ ⇒ t.
Define ρ0SO′(a) to be the constant function a for a primitive choice a. It is easy to see
that ρSO′(a) = fa for all choices a ∈ C. Define a preference relation S on the AA
acts of the form ρSO′(a) by taking fa S fb iff a  b. The fact that S is well defined
follows from Proposition 5, for if fa = fa′ , then it easily follows that a ≡AX a′, so
a ∼ a′. Clearly S satisfies extended statewise cancellation, and satisfies A1 iff 
does. Thus, by Theorem 12, there is an additively separable representation of .
Now we adjust the state and outcome spaces to get a constructive SEU
representation. Suppose first that A1 holds. Take S = AtAX(T0) and take O =
AtAX(T0) × A0. For a primitive choice a ∈ A0, define ρ0SO(a)(δ) = (δ, a). To com-
plete the proof, it clearly suffices to find a probability measure p on AtAX(T0) and a
utility function v on AtAX(T0) × A0 such that u(δ, a) = p(δ)v(δ, a), where u is the
state-dependent utility function whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 12. This
is accomplished by taking any probability measure p on AtAX(T0) such that for all
atoms δ, p(δ) > 0, and taking v(δ, a) = u(δ, a)/p(δ).
If A1 does not hold, then proceed as above, using Theorem 12 to get an entire
set U ′ of functions u : AtAX(T0) × A0 → R, and a single probability distribution p
that assigns positive probability to every atom. Let U consist of all utility functions
u such that there exists some u′ ∈ U ′ such that u(α, δ) = u′(δ, a)/p(δ). In this
representation, again, the state space is AtAX(T0).
We now give a representation using a single utility function. Let S ′ =
AtAX(T0)× EXAX(), and let O′′ = AtAX(T0)×A0 × EXAX(). Define
ρ0S′O′′(a)(δ,′) = (δ, a,′). For t ∈ T0, define piS′(t) = piS(t) × EXAX(). As
before, let U ′ be the set of utility functions on AtAX(T0) × A0 that represent .
Lemma 2 shows that U ′ consists of one utility function u′ for every total order ′∈
EXAX(). Again, fix a probability measure p on AtAX(T0) such that p(δ) > 0 for all
δ ∈ AtAX(T0). For each relation′∈ EXAX(), define p′ on AtAX(T0)×EXAX()
by taking p′(δ,′′) = p(δ) if ′=′′, and p′(δ,′′) = 0 if ′ 6=′′. Let P =
{p′ :′∈ EXAX()}. Define v(δ, a,′) = u′(δ, a)/p(δ). It is easy to see that
P × {v} represents . Moreover, it easily follows that, with this representation, t
and  ⊕ (a, b) can be represented by updating.
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Now we show how the ideas in this proof can be modified to prove Theorems 4
and 4c.
Proof of Theorems 4 and 4c. Again, it is easy to check that if there is a constructive
SEU representation of , then  satisfies A2′.
For the converse, given a preference relation  that satisfies A2′. The struc-
ture of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 8. We first prove an analogue of
Theorem 12.
Theorem 13. A preference relation  on a set C of Savage acts mapping a finite set
S of states to a finite set O of outcomes satisfies extended statewise cancellation iff
there exists a set U of utility functions on S ×O such that a  b iff∑
ss∈S
u
(
s, a(s)
) ≥ u(s, b(s))for all u ∈ U . (3)
Moreover,  satisfies A1 iff U can be chosen to be a singleton.
The proof of Theorem 13 is identical to that of Theorem 12, except that we
need an analogue of Lemma 1 for the case that  satisfies A2′. Let D and D+ be
defined as in Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. If  satisfies A2′ There exists a cone CC such that D+ = CC ∩D.
Proof. Again, let CC consist of all vectors of the form α1d1 + · · · + αndn for some
n > 0, where d1, . . . , dn ∈ D+ and α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0. Clearly CC is a cone. Since
C is closed and bounded, so is D, and A3 implies that D+ is closed and bounded.
Therefore CC is closed. Furthermore, D+ ⊆ CC ∩ D. For the converse inclu-
sion, suppose that α1d1 + · · · + αndn = d, where d1, . . . , dn ∈ D+, d ∈ D, and
α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0. That means that α1, . . . , αn is a nonnegative solution to the system
of equations x1d1 + · · · + xndn = d. Since all the coefficients in these equations
are rational (in fact, they are all 0, 1, and −1) there exists a nonnegative ratio-
nal solution to this system of equations. It easily follows that there exist positive
integers β1, . . . , βn+1 such that β1d1 + · · · + βndn = βn+1d. By definition, there
must exist a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, a, b ∈ C such that a − b = d, ai − bi = di, and
ai  bi for i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that {{a1, . . . , a1, . . . , an, . . . , an, b, . . . , b}} =
{{b1, . . . , b1, . . . , an, . . . , an, b, . . . , b}}, where ai occurs in the left-hand multiset βi
times and b occurs βn+1 times, and, similarly, bi occurs in the right-hand side βi times
and a occurs βn+1 times. A2′ now implies that a  b, so d ∈ CC , as desired.
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The proof of Theorem 13 is now identical to that of Theorem 12. Moreover,
the proof of Theorem 4 now follows from Theorem 13 in exactly the same way that
the proof of Theorem 8 follows from Theorem 12.
Proof of Theorems 10 and 10c. First, let S = AtAX(T0) and O′ = A0. As in the
proof of Theorem 8, using Theorem 12, we can find an additively separable repre-
sentation of ; that is, we can find a set U of utility functions on S = AtAX(T0)×A0
that represent . Let o1 and o0 denote the best and worst outcomes guaranteed to
exist by A4. Note that it follows from A4 and A5 that u(δ, o0) ≤ u(δ, a) ≤ u(δ, o1)
for all (δ, a) ∈ S. (For null atoms δ, we must in fact have u(δ, o0) = u(δ, a) = u(δ, o1)
for all a ∈ A0). Furthermore, note that we can replace u by u′, where u′(δ, a) =
u(δ, a) − u(δ, o0) for all (δ, a) ∈ S to get an equivalent representation; thus, by ap-
propriate scaling, we can assume without loss of generality that, for all u ∈ U , we
have that u(δ, o0) = 0 for all δ ∈ AtAX(T0) (so u(δ, a) ≥ 0 for all (δ, a) ∈ S) and
that
∑
δ′∈AtAX(T0) u′(δ
′, o1) = 1. Finally, note that it easily follows from A3 that, for
all o ∈ O, there exists a unique co ∈ [0, 1] such that o ∼ coo1 + (1 − co)o0 (in fact,
co = inf{c : co1 +(1− c)o0  o}). Clearly co1 = 1 and co0 = 0. By A5, it follows that
o ∼δ coo1 + (1 − co)o0 for all atoms δ. Thus, we must have that u(δ, o) = c0u(δ, o1)
for all atoms δ and all u ∈ U .
We now construct a state-independent SEU representation using O as the
outcome space. Let S ′ = AtAX(T0)×A0 ×EX+AX(). Define pi0S′ by taking pi0S(t) =
∪δ⇒t{δ × A0 × EX+AX()}, and define ρSO(a)((δ, a′,′)) to be a if a ∈ O; o1 if
a ∈ A0 − O and a ′δ a′; and o0 otherwise. Let u′ be defined by taking u′(o) = co.
Finally, recall that we can take U = {u′ :′∈ EX+AX()}, where u′ represents ′.
Let p′ be defined so that p′(δ, a,′′) = 0 and, for all a ∈ A0, p′({(δ, a′,′) : a ′
a′}) = u′(δ, a). It is easy to check that a probability measure p′ can be defined so
as to satisfy this constraint. In particular, note that p′({δ}×A0×{′}) = u′(δ, o1).
For all (δ, a) ∈ S, we have that
u′(δ, a) =
∑
a′: a′a′
p′(δ, a′,′) =
∑
a′∈A0
p′(δ, a′,′)u(ρS′O(a)(δ, a′,′)).
It follows that P and u represent , where P = {p′ :′∈ EX+AX()}. As usual, it
is straightforward to verify that updating works appropriately.
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